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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
cution sales, thus benefiting both creditors and debtors.147 This benefit
could be insured by amending CPLR 5236 to provide for greater court
supervision. 148 Until the Legislature acts, courts should not hesitate to
fashion remedies even after the sale when circumstances warrant relief.
ARTICLE 75-ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Court of Appeals adopts separability approach where a
broad arbitration clause is present.
New York has required that the issue of fraud in the inducement
of a contract containing an arbitration clause be determined by the
court and not the arbitrators. The law stems from a 1957 decision of
the Court of Appeals in Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotnick. 49 Implicit in
the Court's decision was the assumption that arbitration clauses were not
separable from the principal contract; therefore, if the contract were
tainted with fraud, the entire contract was invalid, including the ar-
bitration clause. 5 0 The application of this approach affected the nature
of the remedy sought: if the party's complaint prayed for damages
under the contract, he was said to have ratified the contract rendering
the arbitration clause therein enforceable; only if the party elected to
rescind the contract could he avoid arbitration. 151
147 See generally 6 WK&-M 5236.02. One rationale for the abolition of the right of
redemption is that the purchaser at an execution sale will pay more for an absolute title
than for a title which is subject to redemption. As one authority has noted, however,
redemptive rights do have certain advantages.
The utility of these statutes [allowing redemption] arises out of the fact that the
most frequent customer at a foreclosure sale is the mortgagee himself, being thereby
the purchaser from whom redemption is to be made. . . . These statutes offer a
strong inducement to the mortgagee to bid a price commensurate with the value
of the land.
SA P. POWELL, TnE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 470 (P. Rohan ed. 1973).
Just as the mortgagee is frequently the purchaser at a foreclosure sale, the judgment
creditor is often the buyer at execution sales. When the creditor buys property at less
than its market value, he receives a windfall unless the full fair market value of the prop-
erty is credited against his judgment. While the CPLR makes no express provision for
this, one New York court has held that CPLR 5240 gives the court power to grant such
a credit. See Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d 32, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1973), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 159, 188
(1973); cf. RPAPL § 1371.
148 See note 133 supra.
149 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (4-3).
150Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin -What Does It Mean? 43 ST. JonN's L.
REv. 1, 10-11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Aksen]. The traditional view is espoused by Pro-
fessor Corbin: "It would seem that if the alleged defect exists, it effects the provision for
arbitration just as much as it affects the other provisions." 6A A. CORBiN, Co'TRAcrs § 1444
at 449 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CoRBiN].
251 Wrap-Vertiser Corp. v. Plotaick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 19, 143 N.E.2d 366, 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d
639, 640 (1957).
Where an action for rescission is brought to recover the benefits conferred by the
wronged party as a result of the transaction, and the court exercises its equitable powers to
avoid the contract ab initio, there is no difficulty in reasoning that "[i]f there has never
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The Wrap-Vertiser decision was based on the court's construction
of CPA 1450, which called for arbitration where there was "no substan-
tial issue as to the making of the contract or submission or the failure to
comply therewith .... "152 Almost identical language is employed in the
Federal Arbitration Act,153 which was modeled upon the earlier New
York law. An anomalous situation arose when the United States Su-
preme Court, in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 54
subsequently construed the Federal Act as requiring the question of
fraudulent inducement to be decided by the arbitrators. 5 5 The Court
applied the separability doctrine in holding that where the question of
been a contract at all, there has never been as part of it an agreement to arbitrate; the
greater includes the less." Heyman v. Darwins, [1942] 1 All E.R. 337, 345 (H.L.). In re
Coler, 39 App. Div. 2d 656, 331 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1972), circumvented this result
on the dubious theory that
regardless of the possibility that the ultimate result of the arbitration might be
vitiation of the very contract under which the arbitration will have taken place
... the contract will have remained viable for a sufficient period of time to sustain
the arbitration.
Id. at 656, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 938-39. But see the dissenting opinion of Presiding Justice
McGivern, adhering to the position enunciated in Wrap-Vertiser, that in a claim for
rescission the contract tainted with fraud is void ab initio. Id. at 657, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
However, an action at law seeking damages for fraud sounds in tort and can be re-
garded as leaving the entire contract intact with the arbitration clause as a component
part thereof. This view was followed in Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co.,
3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1957) (mem.), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148
N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958). See generally CoaniN, supra note 150, § 1444.
152 In 1963, CPA 1450 was superseded by CPLR 7503, which compels arbitration
"[w]here there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made or complied
with .. " No legislative change was intended; the "agreement" referred to is the agree-
ment to arbitrate. SECOND RE'. 135, cited in 8 WK&M 7503.02. See also Durst v. Abrash,
22 App. Div. 2d 39, 41, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 445, 213 N.E2d 887,
266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965).
153 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970), formerly 43 Stat. 883 (1925), as amended, 66 Stat. 669 (1947),
provides for a court order directing arbitration "upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
164 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
155 Id. at 402-04. In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed under rule 60, 364 US. 801 (1960), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was the intention of Congress in enacting the
United States Arbitration Act to create a body of national substantive law under its mari-
time and commerce powers. While Prima Paint does not compel state courts to conform
to its interpretation of the Federal Act, it has been the policy of the New York courts
to adopt the separability approach in maritime and commercial transactions. See A/S J.
Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E.2d 774, 307 N.Y.S.2d
660, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Refining,
Ltd., 37 App. Div. 2d 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Ist Dep't 1971) (mem.). Such application had
the commendable result of discouraging forum shopping and insuring uniformity in inter-
state commercial transactions. See Aksen, supra note 150, at 19-23. But the courts still
refused to apply separability in purely intrastate transactions. Such a distinction dis-
regarded the intent of the parties, whose decision to arbitrate is unlikely to have been
made on the basis of whether or not their transaction embraced interstate commerce.
Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190, 199-200 n.2, 298 N.E.2d 42, 48-49 n.2, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848,
856-57 n.2 (1973).
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fraud did not relate to the arbitration clause itself, the clause could be
severed from the contract in which it was embedded and enforced. 56
Though criticized, 157 Wrap-Vertiser continued as the law in New
York. Several cases purported to limit the Wrap-Vertiser holding on the
ground that the language of the arbitration clause under consideration
there was too narrow to cover the issue of fraud; 18 indeed, some of the
subsequent rulings attempted to declare Wrap-Vertiser sui generis. 5 9
A careful examination of the different clauses reveals the artificiality
of the distinctions drawn.160 In an effort to reconcile these various rul-
ings, recent cases left the issue in a legal quagmire.' 6 '
1G6 388 US. at 404. This result has been sustained on the theory that "the mutual
promises to arbitrate form the quid pro quo of one another and constitute a separable
and enforceable part of the agreement." Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402, 411 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 US. 909 (1960), dismissed under rule 60,
364 U.S. 801 (1960).
157 See, e.g., CoRBiN, supra note 150, § 1444, n.40.15 (1962).
158 See Amphenol Corp. v. Microlab, 49 Misc. 2d 46, 266 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965), aff'd mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 497, 267 N.YS.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966); Fabrex
Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
159 See In re Coler, 39 App. Div. 2d 656, 331 N.YS.2d 938 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 31
N.Y.2d 775, 291 N.E.2d 385, 339 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1972); Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23
Misc. 2d 26, 200 N.YS.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
160 The parties in Wrap-Vertiser had agreed to submit any question "as to the valid-
ity, interpretation or performance of [the] agreement." 5 N.Y.2d at 20, 143 N E.2d at 367,
163 N.Y.S.2d at 641. In In re Coler, 39 App. Div. 2d 656, 331 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't 1972),
they had agreed to settle by arbitration "[a]ny controversy or dispute which may arise
between the parties and which shall not be adjusted by mutual agreement . I. " Id. at 656,
n.1, 331 N.YS.2d at 939, n.l. In In re Fabrex Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200 N.YS.2d 278 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1960), the agreement was to submit "[a]ny controversy arising under or in
relation to this contract...." Id. at 26, 200 N.YS.2d at 279.
161 The decision of Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1st
Dep't 1972), is in large measure responsible for the state of confusion, wavering between
separability and the more traditional approach. See note 164 infra. The case is discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L REv. 549, 550, 561-63 (1973). The author there
urges a reconcilation of the New York and federal approaches.
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court recognized that it was "not entirely clear"
whether a party seeking rescission of a contract in New York based on fraud in the induce-
ment could obtain prior judicial resolution. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
US. 395, 400, n.3 (1967), comparing Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174
N.E2d 463, 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961), and Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen
Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162 N.YS.2d 214 (Ist Dep't 1957) (mem.), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 722,
148 N.E.2d 319, 171 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958), with Fabrex Corp. v. Winard Sales Co., 23 Misc.
2d 26, 200 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
Exercycle involved a proceeding to stay arbitration on the ground that the principal
contract of employment, containing a broad arbitration provision, was illusory and lacked
mutuality of obligation. The Court ruled that the issue was a matter of interpretation and
for the arbitrators, not the court:
Once it be ascertained that the parties broadly agree to arbitrate a dispute "arising
out of or in connection with" the agreement, is for the arbitrators to decide
what the agreement means and to enforce it according to the rules of law which
they deem appropriate in the circumstances.
9 N.Y.2d at 334, 174 N.E.2d at 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 355. The majority then enumerated
four well-established exceptions to this broad rule:
(1) where fraud or duress results in a voidable agreement;
(2) where the claim is frivolous;
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In view of this situation, the Court of Appeals in a recent case,
Weinrott v. Carp,162 undertook to consider "whether [its] determina-
tion in Matter of Wrap-Vertiser Corp. (Plotnick) [had] retained its vi-
tality in the light of subsequent experience and contemporary attitudes
concerning the role of arbitration in the settlement of commercial dis-
putes .... ,163 The Court proceeded to overrule Wrap-Vertiser, holding
that fraud in the inducement of a contract containing a broad arbitra-
tion clause should be an issue for the arbitrators. 164
The very circumstances which brought the case before the Court
for ultimate determination demonstrate the urgency compelling the
Court to its decision on policy as well as legal grounds. The respondents
allegedly had rights and patents in a construction process to which they
purported to grant the appellants a license. The process involved the
construction of single and double story buildings with panels of ply-
(3) where the subject matter of the agreement sought to be enforced by the arbitra-
tion is illegal;
(4) where a condition precedent to a demand for arbitration has not been satisfied.
Id. at 834-35, 174 N.E.2d at 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356. But principles of contract law preclude
the existence of a valid underlying contract for want of mutuality just as much as for
any of these reasons. See CORBIN, supra note 150, at 449-55. In pointing up the incon-
sistency, concurring Judge Froessel noted that the majority position could only be justified
on the basis of separability. 9 N.Y.2d at 340, 174 N.E.2d at 468, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 360. This
view is supported by Gerald Asken of the American Arbitration Association:
Indeed, Exercycle v. Maratta, the very case which contained dictum to the effect
that arbitration would not lie where the plaintiff seeks rescission for fraud, can it-
self be cited for the proposition that arbitration clauses are separable in New
York . .. . It is difficult in logic to explain how an arbitrator can void such an
agreement unless, in fact, his authority stems from a "separate" contract.
Asken, supra note 150, at 10. But see CORBIN, supra note 150, § 1444, n.40.5; Collins, Arbi-
tration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 736 (1966).
162 32 N.Y.2d 190, 298 N.E.2d 42, 344 N.YS.2d 848 (1973).
163 Id. at 193, 298 N.E.2d at 43, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
164 Id. at 199, 298 N.E.2d at 48, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The Court relied on Housekeeper
v. Lourie, 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (lst Dep't 1972), as support for its decision.
This case reiterates the principle that a contract induced through fraud is not a nullity
but results in a voidable contract; therefore, if the arbitration clause is sufficiently broad
to encompass the issue of fraud in the inducement and such fraud does not run to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue may properly be decided by the arbitrators.
The Housekeeper decision does contain contradictory language. After enunciating
the above principles, the Housekeeper court proceeded to declare the arbitration clause
under consideration an inextricable part of an entire agreement alleged to have been
procured through fraud. The court's result obtained not from its rejection of the
separability doctrine but from its refusal to apply it in the circumstances before it where an
alleged breach of a fiduciary relationship precluded "arm's length negotiations" between
the parties. The party charged with fraud was not only the petitioner's attorney but a
former partner as well. The court cited Prima Paint for the proposition that the separability
rule should apply where "the dominant intention of the parties was to settle their dis-
putes by arbitration." Id. at 285, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 938. Thus Houskeeper provides support
for Weinrott's holding that a broad arbitration clause encompasses the submission of fraud
in the inducement. Id. at 283-84, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37. As Judge Wachtler noted in Wein.
rott, it is only where the alleged fraud relates to the procurement of the arbitration clause
or agreement itself that the fraud question is to be decided preliminarily by the court. 32
N.Y.2d at 198, 298 N.E.2d at 46, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
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wood and polyurethane filler, sufficient in strength to make conven-
tional framing of each structure unnecessary.1 5 The appellants con-
tended that they were induced into the agreement through false and
material misrepresentations of the respondents with regard to the
efficacy of the process, the extent of their ownership in it and its ap-
proval by public officials.
The Supreme Court, New York County, entered an order granting
petitioner's application to stay the arbitration demanded by the respon-
dents.16 The appellate division reversed on the ground that the
amended petition was "insufficient to demonstrate that there [was] a
'substantial question of the existence of a 'valid agreement' to arbi-
trate.'"107 Thus, the court determined preliminarily that the evidence
did not support a claim of fraudulent inducement and directed the
parties to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed'08 and the parties
proceeded to arbitration, resulting in an award to the respondents of
$30,713.47. The protracted litigation re-entered the courts through a
proceeding to confirm the arbitrators' award. The appellants contended
that the American Arbitration Association violated its own rules. The
supreme court upheld the award and the appellate division affirmed.160
Their decision was appealed, bringing the case before the Court of
Appeals for the second time. After a five year interval, the Court con-
sidered anew the issue of fraud in the inducement. In seeking to set
aside the award, the appellants claimed that the arbitrators refused to
admit new evidence of fraud offered by them. The tribunal had ap-
parently concluded that the courts had found no fraud rather than that
the evidence of fraud was insufficient. The Court ruled that even con-
ceding the error, arbitrators are not bound by rules of law and misap-
plication of such rules is not grounds for setting aside an award.'70
Although the Court's decision now places the question of fraudu-
lent inducement with the arbitrators, the Court refused to order arbi-
tration of the fraud issue, stating: "Appellants had a full chance to
present that issue to the courts. There is no need to give appellants
another bite of an apple that has already been chewed to the core."l7t
165 Carp v. Weinrott, 20 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 233 N.E.2d 297, 286 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1967)(mem.).
1661d. at 935, 233 N.E.2d at 298, 286 N.YS.2d at 285.
107 28 App. Div. 2d 671, 672, 282 N.Y.2d 638, 639 (lst Dep't 1967) (mem.).
168 20 N.Y.2d 934, 233 N.E2d 297, 286 N.YS.2d 285 (1967) (mem.).
169 37 App. Div. 2d 548, 322 N.YS.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1971).
170 32 N.Y.2d at 193-94, 298 N.E.2d at 44, 344 N.Y.S2d at 851. The Court relied on
Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626, 237 N.E.2d 223, 225, 289
N.YS.2d 968, 971 (1968), which construed CPLR 7511 similarly.
17132 N.Y.2d at 200, 298 N.E.2d at 48, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
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Judge Wachtler discussed several lower court opinions which had
attempted to distinguish Wrap-Vertiser as sui generis, finding their
differences to lie "more in a different policy regarding arbitration
clauses than in the different arbitration clauses under consideration."'172
He further stated that "[i]n this regard it is noted that all the cases
involved what could fairly be termed broad arbitration agreements."'173
The Court emphasized that its principal aim in construing such a
provision is to determine the intent of the parties and to give it effect:
When the parties to a contract have reposed in arbitrators all ques-
tions concerning the "validity, interpretation or enforcement" of
their agreement, they have selected their tribunal and no doubt
they intend it to determine the contract's "validity" should the
necessity arise. Judicial intervention, based upon a nonseparability
contract theory in arbitration matters prolongs litigation, and de-
feats, as this case conclusively demonstrates, two of arbitration's
primary virtues, speed and finality."' 4
The Court thus found compelling policy grounds for overruling
Wrap-Vertiser. The proceedings in this case reveal that under the old
rule even a party advancing a frivolous claim of fraud in the induce-
ment could forestall arbitration proceedings and vitiate the economy,
efficiency and speed which they are designed to promote. Such dilatory
tactics frustrate both the intent of the parties and the legislative policy
of encouraging arbitration.175
In adopting the federal separability approach, the Weinrott deci-
sion brings New York and federal law into harmony. "[U]nder a broad
arbitration provision the claim of fraud in the inducement should
[now] be determined by arbitrators," even though the balance of the
contract be permeated with fraud.176 The result would be the same
172 Id. at 195, 298 N.E.2d at 45, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
178 Id.
174 Id. at 198, 298 N.E.2d at 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 855 (citations omitted).
175 This policy is evidenced by CPLR 7501 et seq. 32 N.Y.2d at 199, 298 N.E.2d at 47,
344 N.YS.2d at 856.
176 Id., 298 N.E.2d at 48, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 856. A general claim of fraudulent induce-
ment should not be allowed to defeat the arbitration clause where the allegation is simply
that the same fraud which induced the principal contract also induced the arbitration
provision.
It might be argued that the complainant would never have entered into the con-
tract had the defendant not made certain false representations. If a court enter-
tained such an allegation and found no fraud, then an order to arbitrate the
issue of fraud as to the principal contract would follow since the court's jurisdic-
tion is limited to deciding whether an agreement to arbitrate exists. But the issue
before the arbitrator would be the same as those previously decided by the court.
Such a procedure would involve wasteful and time-consuming duplication of
effort and would afford a complainant two "days in court" on the same issues. For
these reasons a court should refuse to entertain an allegation that fraud induced
the arbitration provision if the fraud alleged is not distinct from that claimed to
have induced the principal contract.
Note, Arbitration Clauses and Fraudulent Inducement, 42 WAsH. L. Rav. 621, 625 (1967).
[Vol. 48:611
SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
whether the party seeks damages or rescission. Only where the alleged
fraud runs to the arbitration clause itself may the court enjoin arbitra-
tion. But where the provision is "less than broad" or where an adhesion
contract is employed, "a court should give the provision and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its inclusion in the contract great scrutiny.' 177
CPLR 7503(a): Venue limited to court where action is pending in
application to stay arbitration.
CPLR 7502(a) states that "[a] special proceeding shall be used to
bring before a court the first application arising out of an arbitrable
controversy which is not made by motion in a pending action." It then
sets forth the venue for making such application.
The statute's aim is to provide that it is this first application which
commences the special proceeding178 and to assure the proper service
and notice safeguards of article 4 proceedings in general, 179 at least
where no action is pending and thus the parties are not yet before the
court. But neither the language of the section, case law, nor commen-
tary make clear whether, where an action is in fact pending, the pro-
cedure and accompanying venue outlined in CPLR 7502(a) become
unavailable. Must the application regarding arbitration be made in
the court where the action is pending or are the broader venue provi-
sions of CPLR 7502(a) 80 applicable?
If the first application is one to compel arbitration, the problem
is easily resolved, for CPLR 7503(a) mandates that the exclusive forum
for raising such a motion is the one where the action is pending. A com-
parable limitation, however, does not exist in CPLR 7503(b), which
deals with applications to stay arbitration. The fact that the first ap-
plication will most probably be a motion to compel has led to occa-
sional confusion and imprecise analysis when dealing with these separate
statutory provisions: the section 7503(a) motion to compel arbitration
on one hand, and the "first application" of section 7502(a) on the
other.'8 ' If, in fact, the first application arising out of an arbitrable
'77 32 N.Y.2d at 199, 298 N.E.2d at 48, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Such circumstances may
indicate, as in Housekeeper v. Lourie, 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Ist Dep't 1972),
that the arbitration provision was inserted as part of an overall scheme to defraud.
178 The arbitration does not take on the character of a special proceeding until this
application is made. In re Gaffagnio, 48 Misc. 2d 441, 264 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955); In re Beverly Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 376, 256 N.Y.S.2d 812
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
179 See 7B M"cKINNEY'S CPLR 7502(a), commentary at 480 (1963); 8 WK&M 7502.02.
180 The venue shall be "... [the] county specified in the agreement; or if none be
specified, [where] one of the parties resides or is doing business, or, if there is no such
county,... in any county; .... " CPLR 7502(a). Since this is inconsistent with article 5,
the latter is inapplicable to arbitration proceedings. 7B MCKiNNEY'S CPLR 7502(a), com-
mentary at 480 (1963).
181 See, e.g., the practice commentary accompanying CPLR 7502(a), which in discussing
1974]
